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The so-called European ‘migration crisis’ became headline news in 2015. On 
19th April there was an incident in which more than 800 migrants died in the 
central Mediterranean between Libya and Malta. In November 2015, the UNHCR 
reported nearly 3,500 dead or missing across the entire region (UNHCR, 2015). 
The final death toll for 2015 was estimated at over 3700 (IOM, 2016). Indeed, a 
relatively sudden increase of unauthorised migration from the Middle East via 
Turkey to Greece and through the Balkans provoked disarray in established 
mechanisms for managing migration across the EU. These developments were 
met by polarised political and public responses. On the one hand, borders closed 
and an emergent anti-migration position became increasingly prevalent. This 
was evident in the closure of the Balkan route, and in statements made by 
leaders such as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban about the need to 
prevent migration to the EU. On the other hand, concerns over the humanitarian 
plight of refugees and migrants became increasingly significant. This was evident 
in the increasing levels of volunteer activism across Europe as well as in the 
public outcry that emerged when pictures of the body of drowned toddler Aylan 
Kurdi went viral in September 2015.  
 
In this context, terminology reflects polarised positions. Phrases such as ‘illegal 
migration’ and the ‘migration crisis’ often imply an anti-migration response, 
while terms such as ‘forced migration’ and the ‘refugee crisis’ are often 
associated with a humanitarian alternative. This article rejects the normative 
and political terms of this debate and refers instead to ‘unauthorised migration’ 
as a phenomenon that emerges through the relation between migratory forces 
and forces that render these ‘illegal’ or irregular (Squire, 2011). However, it does 
so in terms that seek neither to overlook nor to assume what is often referred to 
as ‘migrant agency’ (Squire, 2015a). As Cetta Mainwaring has more recently 
suggested, paying attention to the “agency used to negotiate mobility” is to look 
at the “intersection between migrant agency and sovereign power” in terms that 
demonstrate migrants are not “victims or villains” (2016: 5-6). Indeed, an 
emphasis on migrant agency has become increasingly prominent in literatures in 
the field of migration and border studies, precisely in order to challenge 
oversimplified conceptions of people on the move either as victims of violence 
and exploitation, or as villains who commit crimes (Anderson, 2008; Sharma, 
2003; Squire, 2009). In this context, Brigit Anderson and Martin Ruhs argue that 
“theorising migrant agency is of crucial importance”, because migrants “interact 
with and help shape policy, which is itself reactive to migrants as well as to 
broader political and economic climate” (2010: 178).  
 
This article draws on the critical insights of scholarship that emphasises how 
migrant agency, subjectivities and practices are dimensions that are often 
lacking from analyses of unauthorised or irregular migration (see also Squire 
2011).1 Yet in taking seriously Anderson and Ruhs’ suggestion, it also seeks to 
contribute to such literatures by interrogating the concept of ‘migrant agency’ in 
further detail. In particular, the article interrogates the structure/agency debate 
in social science as a means to highlight the analytical and normative importance 
of exercising care in engaging the concept of ‘migrant agency’.2 The so-called 
European ‘migration crisis’ does not only raise questions for policy-makers and 
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for European politics more broadly. So also does it raise questions about how a 
critical analysis of the politics of unauthorised migration can effectively proceed 
in both analytical and normative terms. How to develop analysis that fosters full 
understanding of the dynamics of unauthorised migration, yet in a way that can 
shift the terms of a debate which has become worryingly polarised? More 
precisely, how to do so in a way that does not perpetuate broader assumptions 
about people on the move as being victims of circumstance and/or culpable for 
their situation?  
 
In reflecting on such questions, this article considers what the most appropriate 
conceptual tools are by which to develop an analysis of ‘unauthorised migration’. 
It asks: Is ‘migrant agency’ an effective critical concept in the context of a so-
called European migration ‘crisis’? How helpful are the social scientific concepts 
of structure and agency for critical scholarship in the field of border and 
migration studies? By considering different positions in the structure/agency 
debate and focusing in some detail on Colin Hay’s influential discussion of this 
debate, the article suggests the need for caution in engaging structure-agency as 
a conceptual frame by which to examine the politics of unauthorised migration. 
Such a frame is both analytically problematic in its simplification of processes of 
subjectivity formation, as well as normatively and politically problematic in the 
context of debates around unauthorised migration. Given that discussions of 
structure-agency can easily slip into the legitimisation of wider assumptions 
about the culpability and/or victimhood of people on the move, I do not re-adopt 
the language of structure/agency in critical terms (Mainwaring, 2016) but rather 
I suggest that alternative conceptual tools are crucial. The article thus goes on to 
highlight the significance of Michel Foucault’s theorisation of subjectification for 
critical scholarship in the field, and elaborates the alternative concepts of acts, 
interventions and effects that emerge from this literature. It suggests that these 
concepts are better attuned than structure/agency to the dynamics of power-
resistance, which are integral to the politics of unauthorised migration in the 
context of a so-called ‘migration crisis’.  
 
 
Structure and agency  
 
This article will first consider how conventional positions within the structure-
agency debate involve the framing of subjects in simplistic terms as more or less 
intentional, rather than as constituted through processes of subjectification that 
are embedded in dynamics of power-resistance. The relationship between 
structure and agency has long been a concern for social scientists and for 
scholars within the field of Politics and IR in particular. In his influential review 
of different positions on structure/agency, Colin Hay (2002) defines the debate 
as concerned with explanation of a social or political outcome. To understand 
how unauthorised migration emerges as an outcome in this regard, the frame 
can be approached in relation to two broad positions: structuralist and 
intentionalist.  
 
While structuralists refer predominantly to structural or contextual factors in 
the process of explanation, intentionalists refer primarily to agential or conduct-
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orientated factors (Hay, 2002, pp. 93-5, 97, 101-112). As Hay notes, highlighting 
these oppositional positions within the structure/agency debate enables 
appreciation of the differences between structuralist and intentionalist accounts 
of social and political phenomena. Generally, structuralist approaches are 
orientated toward order and continuity over time (Hay, 2002, p. 95). By contrast, 
intentionalist approaches tend to develop a presentist and particularist focus, 
and do not focus so much on putting cases in wider historical and political 
context (Hay, 2002, p. 112). This is because the latter reflects a concern with an 
agent’s capacity to realise their intentions (Hay, 2002, pp. 94-5). 
 
Let’s first turn to consider how structuralists might explain unauthorised 
migration. Structuralists are more likely to focus on longer-standing drivers of 
migration, such as established social and economic inequalities or conflict in 
countries of origin. In classical migration theory, such ‘push’ factors are also 
examined in relation to ‘pull’ factors in host countries, most notably labour 
market opportunities but also social networks and family ties (see Castles and 
Miller, 2008). In order to explain the phenomena of unauthorised migration from 
a structuralist perspective, a combination of factors would therefore be 
important to understand migration flows on the macro-scale as relatively 
sedimented over time. In addition, an appreciation of institutionalised factors 
such as visa regimes would be important in providing explanation for the 
distinctly unauthorised character of migration. After all, without such 
mechanisms, the process of migration would not involve the routes and methods 
that render it unauthorised.  
 
A structuralist orientation can in this sense be helpful in pointing to the 
conditions under which unauthorised migrations occur, both in terms of 
structural inequalities driving migration as well as the institutional mechanisms 
through which migration is ‘made irregular’ (De Genova, 2002). Nevertheless, 
there is a tendency in structuralist explanations to overlook the significance of 
‘migrant agency’ within such a process, because the intentions of people on the 
move are precluded by conditions related to broader structural factors. If 
migrant agency exists in the structuralist approach at all, it is only a constrained 
form of agency as intentionality. This intentionality simply reflects broader 
structural factors pushing and/or pulling people to migrate. 
 
By contrast, an intentionalist orientation provides for an alternative explanation, 
which emphasises the decision of migrants to migrate as key to explaining the 
emergence of unauthorised migration. Attention here would be paid more to the 
capacity of those migrating to act in ways that are not constrained by wider 
structural inequalities and existing institutional or contextual factors, such as 
restrictive visa regimes. A decontextualized intentionalist reading of migration in 
this regard would approach the decision to migrate in relation to a liberal subject 
who is free to choose. This overlooks the insights of a structuralist approach, but 
also has some similarities given the mutual emphasis on agency as confined to 
intentionality.  
 
Going beyond this liberal intentionalist position, a more critical reading of 
migrant agency can be identified in analyses inspired by autonomous Marxism. 
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This approach does not overlook structural inequalities, but nevertheless 
privileges migrant autonomy as a critical tool by which to analyse the subjective 
dimension of migrant decision-making over structural and institutional forces 
(e.g. Mezzadra and Nielsen, 2003). On this reading, the very presence of 
unauthorised migration within a privileged and heavily policed EU can be 
interpreted as evidence of the autonomy or agency of those migrating and thus 
of the limitations of structural inequalities and institutionalised mechanisms of 
control. These works highlight what might be described as the critical potential 
of an agency-oriented approach, whereby migrants become viewed as actors 
generating change.  
 
A clear difference is evident here between liberal and autonomous Marxist 
accounts of migrant agency. The latter ‘autonomy of migration’ approach is 
significant in shifting from the misunderstanding of a freely choosing subject. 
However, this difference is one that is often overlooked in the use of the term 
autonomy more broadly, as we will see later. Moreover, what is of note for now 
is that both approaches lie in contrast with a structuralist reading, the latter of 
which focuses on the dominating tendencies of embedded social, political and 
economic structures that constrain the capacity of migrants to effect change. 
Autonomy is thus often associated with the freedom of choice and action in this 
regard, and as we will see can often be used interchangeably in debates of 
structure/agency. 
 
In sum, social scientific conceptions of structure and agency as manifest in the 
conventional distinction between structuralism and intentionalism provide 
explanation of unauthorised migration in terms that are overly simplistic. 
Though a review of structualist and intentionalist positions provides important 
insights into how unauthorised migration can be explained, these approaches 
view subjects as more or less intentional rather than as formed through 
dynamics of power-resistance. They thus fail to explore more fully how the 
assumption of an intentional subject involves struggles to legitimize and 
delegitimize different forms of subject formation. In other words, the concepts of 
structure and agency can be problematic because they can disregard practices of 
governing that divide ‘good’ from ‘bad’ subjects. A shift to autonomy over 
intentionality may in part help to shift the focus to a subject that contests power. 
Yet if ‘migrant agency’ is simply assumed to be an alternative starting point to 
the analysis of structural inequalities and institutionalized mechanisms of 
control, the relation between power and resistance is not properly accounted for. 
It is thus to relational approaches to structure-agency that we will now turn. 
 
Structure-agency 
 
As we have seen, the core of the structure-agency debate refers to the question of 
whether or not – or to what extent – the choices and conduct of actors are 
conditioned by contextual factors, such as established patterns of interaction and 
organisation (see Hay, 2002, pp. 89-134). Nevertheless, and as the discussion 
above already partly hints at, the opposite extremes of structuralism and 
intentionalism have been subject to significant critique over recent years (Hay, 
2002, pp. 101-112, 117). That is, scholars tend to concur that both structural and 
 5 
intentional or agential factors need to be taken into consideration when 
providing a political explanation of specific outcomes and effects. Hay suggests 
that this can be understood in relation to a longer tradition, exemplified in the 
work of Marx, who in the opening passage of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte declared that: “men make their own history, but not of their own free 
will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen” (cited in Hay, 2002, 
p. 118). In other words, and as indicated in the discussion of critical analyses of 
unauthorised migration above, from this perspective both structural and 
intentionalist or agential factors are important for understanding the 
contemporary phenomena of unauthorised migration.  
 
This insight about the relational character of structure-agency is one that is also 
embedded in the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1984), which has 
been highly influential in challenging the dualism of structure and agency. 
Giddens makes the case for what he calls the duality of structure. Structure for 
him is understood both as the medium for conduct, and as the outcome of 
conduct (thus forming a duality). Structuration thus refers to the ways that social 
relations are structured across time through this duality (Ibid: 374-6). Giddens 
in this regard seeks to render structure and agency ontological equals rather 
than privileging one over the other. This facilitates an analysis that considers 
how each is mutually implicated in, or mutually constitutive of, the other. For 
Giddens, structure refers to rules and resources that are embedded in the 
memory traces of agents. In other words, structure is implicated in the formation 
of an agent and in the social practices of agents, and is thus integral to the 
dynamic formation of social order. Yet agents are not only bounded within 
structure, but also act with reflexivity by monitoring their own actions. In this 
regard both agential and structural dimensions are important in Giddens’ 
structuration theory, which involves a processual analysis that focuses on the 
dynamism of social and political relations (see also Hay, 2002, pp. 118-121).  
 
The critical realist scholar, Margaret Archer, has also examined structure and 
agency in their relationality. By contrast to Giddens, however, she stresses the 
importance of distinguishing structure from agency. Archer views structure and 
agency as interacting rather than as mutually constitutive, and thus approaches 
structure and agency as analytically incommensurable (Archer, 1995). What is 
distinctive about her approach is the suggestion that structure should be 
understood as analytically prior to, and even temporally preceding, agency. Hay 
summarises:  
 
Archer insists that structure and agency reside in different temporal 
domains, such that the pre-existence of structure is a condition of 
individual action: structures (as emergent entities) are not only 
irreducible to people, they pre-exist them, and people are not puppets of 
structures because they have their own emergent properties which mean 
they either reproduce or transform social structure, rather than creating 
it. 
(Hay, 2002, p. 125) 
 
Archer thus points to the possibilities as well as the difficulties for agents to 
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change structures. For her, structures are always more than simply the collation 
of the conduct of agents, yet given their sedimentation over time structures are 
also difficult to penetrate for individual agents. Interestingly, Archer’s work on 
the temporal privileging of structure here lies in tension to the autonomy of 
migration approach, briefly discussed above, whereby the subjective decisions of 
migrants are addressed as temporally preceding operations of control (see 
Mezzadra, 2004). Neither autonomy of migration nor Archer’s approach in this 
sense address the dynamics of power-resistance as equivalent relational terms. 
We will come back to examine the autonomy of migration approach later; for 
now, let’s consider further variants of critical realism, beyond the work of 
Archer. 
 
Hay, who is critical of Archer’s approach, provides an alternative approach to the 
structure-agency relation, which grants more effectiveness to agents without 
overlooking the importance of addressing contextual constraints. He suggests 
that the problem with Archer’s approach is that she does not view structure and 
agency beyond the perspective of an individual or particular agent. That is, she 
fails to acknowledge the mutuality of structure and agency. Hay here not only 
draws on the critical realist approach of Roy Bhaskar who is influential to the 
work of Archer (Hay, 2002, pp. 122-7), but also on the work of critical realist Bob 
Jessop, in order to outline a strategic-relational approach to structure and 
agency. He says: 
 
Starting with structure and agency, a pairing which seems automatically 
to invoke a conceptual dualism, Jessop seeks to bring agency into 
structure – producing a structured context (an action setting) – and to 
bring structure into agency – producing a contextualised actor (a situated 
agent). In moving to this new pairing of concepts, the conceptual dualism 
has been partially overcome. Yet Jessop does not stop here. A repeat move 
– bringing the situated actor back into the structured context and the 
structural context to the situated actor – yields a new conceptual pairing 
in which the dualism of structure and agency has been dissolved. Jessop 
now identifies a strategic actor within a strategically selective context. 
(Hay, 2002: 128) 
 
Hay points here not to the determinacy of particular conducts by context, as a 
more structuralist reading would. Instead, he points to the ways in which specific 
outcomes are more or less likely, dependent on the strategic selectivity of the 
context and the strategies that agents deploy. This involves what he calls a 
dynamic social ontology, in which both structure and agency are integral, yet 
through which the dualism (as well as the duality) of structure-agency is rejected 
through the preferred emphasis on strategic context and strategic action (see 
also Hay, 2001). 
 
These various elaborations on the complexity of structure-agency beyond the 
dualism of structure/agency are important. A relational approach potentially 
facilitates a consideration of unauthorised migration as emerging through 
dynamics of power-resistance, which are not separable but intertwined or co-
constitutive. However, a question remains as to whether subjects remain as 
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simply more or less intentional in the approaches reviewed thus far, rather than 
as constituted through processes of subjectification that involve struggles over 
the de/legitimisation of different forms of subjectivity. For example, do structure 
and agency really ‘dissolve’ in their multiple cross fertilization, or does Jessop 
and Hay’s fractioning of the terms condition their return in a more complex 
formation? To what extent does the individual intentional subject effectively 
recede in such an approach? And to what extent can such an approach move 
beyond the assumption of subjects as culpable or innocent, evident in recent 
debates around the so-called ‘migration crisis’? It is here that I want to explore 
further the limits of structure-agency both as an analytical framework and in 
terms of the normative implications that it brings to bear in its connection to the 
liberal conception of a (more or less) freely choosing subject (see also 
Mainwaring, 2016). I will do so with specific reference to the work of Hay, given 
limitations of space. 
 
The limits of structure-agency 
 
As the above review of selected relational accounts of structure-agency indicates, 
the structure/agency frame offers various ways of conceptualising the 
significance of ‘migrant agency’ in relation to the question of how unauthorised 
migration has emerged as a political phenomenon or outcome. Beyond the 
structuralist and intentionalist extremes highlighted in the first section, ‘migrant 
agency’ can be understood as a medium and outcome of conduct, which occurs 
under conditions of constraint that are not fixed but constituted dynamically 
through the very process of unauthorised migration itself (Giddens). ‘Migrant 
agency’ can also be viewed in terms of the conduct of people on the move, who 
either reproduce or transform structures that pre-exist them and that constitute 
their movement as unauthorised (Archer). Furthermore, ‘migrant agency’ can be 
understood as a strategic action within a strategically selective context, with 
unauthorised migration more or less successful in transforming the conditions 
under which it is constituted as such (Hay).  
 
Nevertheless, a question arises here about the analytical appropriateness of 
structure and agency as terms that can capture the dynamics of power-
resistance effectively. Moreover, a question also arises about whether engaging 
‘migrant agency’ and undertaking an analysis of unauthorised migration within 
the frame of structure-agency is critically effective under conditions marked by a 
so-called ‘migration crisis’. Despite the sophistication of these various 
approaches, are discussions about reflexive conduct, pre-existing structures and 
strategic action effective in addressing the complex and diverse formation of 
subjects under dynamics of power-resistance? Moreover, are they helpful in a 
context marked by a debated polarised between exclusionary and humanitarian 
extremes? Given the limits of space I will focus here a more careful reading of 
Hay’s work, which I suggest can shed light on the problems of structure-agency 
as a frame for ‘migrant agency’. While approaches that move further away from 
the language and conventional framework of structure/agency might effectively 
destabilize the intentional subject within which the debate is grounded (e.g. 
Mainwaring, 2016), I question the extent to which a critical realist approach does 
so through further examining the work of Hay in particular. 
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It is my contention that the grounding of structure/agency in discussions about 
the intentionality of subjects is only partially occluded in a shift of focus to a 
strategic actor in a strategic context. It is worthwhile returning here to Hay’s 
discussion of the intentionalist conception of agency, to use this as a point of 
comparison for the notion of agency Hay later goes on to develop from a critical 
realist perspective. He says: 
 
Agency refers to action, in our case to political conduct. It can be defined, 
simply, as the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so 
doing, to attempt to realise his or her intentions. In the same way that the 
notion of structure is not an entirely neutral synonym for context, 
however, the notion of agency implies more than mere political action or 
conduct. In particular, it implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy – 
that the actor could have behaved differently and that this choice between 
potential courses of action was, or at least could have been, subject to the 
actor’s conscious deliberation. In this sense, the term agency tends to be 
associated with a range of other concepts, notably reflexivity (the ability 
of the actor to monitor consciously and to reflect upon the consequences 
of previous action), rationality (the capacity of the actor to select modes 
of conduct best likely to realise a given set of preferences) and motivation 
(the desire and passion with which an actor approaches the attempt to 
realise a particular intention or preference).  
(My emphasis, Hay, 2002: 94-5) 
 
So how does a critical realist emphasis on strategic actors in a strategically 
selective context compare to the intentionalist focus on conscious, free, reflexive, 
rational and wilful actor that Hay describes here? Let’s shift to Hay’s discussion 
of strategic actors now: 
 
Actors, as discussed above, are presumed to be strategic – to be capable of 
devising and revising means to realise their intentions. This immediately 
implies a relationship, and a dynamic relationship at that, between the 
actor (individual or collective) and the context in which she finds herself. 
For, to act strategically, is to project the likely consequences of different 
courses of action and, in turn, to judge the contours of the terrain. It is, in 
short, to orient potential courses of action to perceptions of the relevant 
strategic context and to use such an exercise as a means to select the 
particular course of action to be pursued. On such an understanding, the 
ability to formulate strategy (whether explicitly recognised as such or not) 
is the very condition of action.  
(My emphasis, Hay, 2002: 132). 
 
By contrast to the intentional actor, the strategic actor is here presented as one 
that is constrained or enabled by a strategically selective context and adapts 
their conduct accordingly. This is important in bringing to bear the decision-
making capacity of people on the move, and in understanding how people who 
migrate without capacity are not simply victims or criminals but complex 
strategic actors who make decisions and negotiate conditions that are far from 
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easy (Mainwaring, 2016).  
 
However, a question arises here as to how far Hay’s strategic actor differs from 
the intentional actor that he seeks to move away from. Both the intentional and 
the strategic actor are characterised by their ability to make decisions, and by 
their ability to be in some sense motivated and rational as agents with a reflexive 
form of intentionality. The key difference appears to lie in the level of 
consciousness implied, and the contextual constraints to which a critical realist 
position pays greater attention. For Hay, the strategic actor is not necessarily 
fully cognizant of structuring conditions and his or her driving motivations. 
Nevertheless, the potential for rational and reflexive action appears to remain 
integral to his approach, indicative of some significant similarities between the 
liberal intentional actor and the strategic actor. Indeed, the assumptions of a 
dynamic relational approach to structure-agency are in this sense perhaps not so 
far from intentionalist assumptions than might initially appear to be the case. 
Even Hay’s relational approach involves a simplification of processes of 
subjectivity formation, because the agent or actor is presented as an actor with 
qualities that are pre-defined in particular terms (as individualised and strategic, 
if not fully intentional). Indeed, on this basis Hay’ approach can easily slip into 
the legitimisation of wider assumptions about the culpability and/or victimhood 
of people on the move, because the strategic actor is the given unit of analysis 
rather than that which is unpacked analytically as undergoing a process of 
formation. Returning to structure and agency, even in a more complex 
formulation, thus presents some significant risks – particularly when addressing 
a sensitive issue such as unauthorised migration. 
 
 
Beyond structure-agency? 
 
If the dynamics of power-resistance through which processes of subject 
formation are to be taken seriously, then the strategic actor needs to be analysed 
not simply in terms of a strategic context but in terms of the onto-politics that 
this implies. One of the critical arguments put forward by Hay relates to the non-
empirical nature of any position on structure and agency. He claims that rather 
than providing an empirical assessment of a given phenomenon, any position in 
the structure-agency debate it is ultimately an ontological one related to the 
question of what constitutes an adequate political explanation of a given 
phenomenon.3 Hay thus suggests that ontological assumptions shape political 
explanation and that outcomes therefore cannot simply be assessed on the basis 
of empirical data alone (2002, pp. 90-4). Going further, we can say that there is 
an onto-politics to the process of analysis, which can be exposed in part with 
reference to the position on structure-agency. This of course is not to say that 
empirics are simply defined by analysis or that empirical analysis is simply 
political. Instead, it is to say that the production of knowledge about a given 
phenomenon can also play a role in the constitution of a phenomenon in specific 
terms, and that such a process also has political implications.  
 
The political dimensions of this have been further highlighted by William 
Connolly. He (1995) has emphasised the multiple ways in which being can be 
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posed or to the multiplicity of ontological claims, therefore highlighting the ways 
in which any ontological claim to what exists also involves political assumptions. 
This not only means that we need to pay attention to the way in which 
ontological assumptions condition our interpretations of political phenomena 
such as unauthorised migration, but also that we need to pay attention to the 
political implications of our epistemological and ontological interpretations of 
empirical data. Conceptual interventions have analytical and normative effects, 
to put it another way. This is particularly important for the analysis of 
unauthorised migration in the context of a so-called ‘migration crisis’. For 
example, analysing migration as a ‘threat’ can also lead to its experience as such, 
through the development of policies that become self-fulfilling in their very 
production of unauthorised movement (see Squire, 2009). Both Hay and 
Connolly’s insights are therefore important when applied to this field of analysis, 
because they enable consideration of the political dimensions of different 
analyses or interpretations of unauthorised migration. 
 
If we consider Hay’s approach in this light, addressing the question of ‘migrant 
agency’ in terms of strategic actors orientates analysis both toward assessing the 
capacities and actions of unauthorised migrants within a strategically selective 
context, as well as toward assessing the effects of such actions on a structured 
context. This may shed some light on the issue of unauthorised migration, but 
can also risk further perpetuating politically problematic and often highly 
gendered conceptions of unauthorised migrants as either having excessive and 
problematic agency, or as victims who do not qualify as subjects with agency at 
all. As Alexandra Innes highlights in her discussion of forced migration: “The 
binary of structure and agency posits the refugee as a victim of structure and the 
illegitimate asylum seeker as an agent intent on exploiting the system” (Innes, 
2015: 64). Far from simply assessing migratory strategies in relation to 
particular political outcomes, the frame of structure-agency in this sense risks 
affirming wider assumptions about some forms of migration as being 
illegitimate. Moreover, when addressing a sensitive issue such as unauthorised 
migration, exposing the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1987) may play into a 
politics of control (Scheel, 2013a). Structure-agency in this regard is not only 
analytically problematic in its grounding within questions of intentionality and 
its constraints, but can also become politically or normatively problematic when 
engaging in sensitive and contested issues such as unauthorised migration. 
 
So if the frame of structure-agency is more radically put into question, where 
does this leave the theorisation of ‘migrant agency’ as suggested necessary by 
Anderson and Ruhs? Much critical scholarship does not address unauthorised 
migration directly in terms of ‘migrant agency’, but rather engages in analysis 
that has implications for what might more generally be understood in terms of 
the structure/agency debate. Two approaches stand out as important here: first, 
works inspired by Giorgio Agamben that lean toward the more constraint- or 
context-oriented side of the debate and, second, works already mentioned that 
lean more toward the intentionality- or strategic action- side of the debate by 
engaging the concept of autonomy.  
 
Works that inspired by Giorgio Agamben tend to examine unauthorised 
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migration primarily within the context of sovereign power or violence (e.g. 
Vaughan-Williams, 2008, 2012). Here, ‘migrant agency’ arguably risks becoming 
lost or denied, particularly under the influence of Agamben’s (1998, 2005) 
theorisation of ‘bare life’ as a form of life through which political subjectivity is 
refused. There are dimensions of Agamben’s approach that could be interpreted 
as invoking structuralism, such as the relatively ahistoricity of his analysis 
(Huysmans, 2008) and the relatively consuming conceptualisation of power that 
he appears to present (Squire, 2015b).4 However, his work also sits within a 
wider poststructuralist theoretical tradition, which problematises the ahistorical 
assumptions of fixity associated with structuralist scholarship (see Aradau and 
van Munster, 2010; Campbell, 2006).  Moreover, Agamben’s work has been 
drawn upon by a range of critical scholars who seek to draw out elements 
associated with ‘migrant agency’ precisely within the context of sovereign power 
and biopolitical violence (e.g. Doty, 2011; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; Perera, 
2002; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2005). This has nevertheless led to questions 
about how such an approach risks performatively reducing ‘migrant agency’ 
through the analytical abjectification of unauthorised migrant subjects (McNevin, 
2014; Squire 2011, 2015b; Walters, 2008). 
 
By contrast, the autonomy of migration approach introduced earlier highlights 
the failure of power to domesticate autonomous migrant subjects (see Mezzadra, 
2011; Nielsen and Mezzadra, 2013), and focuses on resistances that ‘precede 
power’ (Papadopoulos et al, 2008). As noted previously, this body of scholarship 
is distinctly autonomist rather than intentionalist. Influenced by autonomous 
Marxism, the autonomy of migration approach does not assume that the action of 
unauthorised migrants is simply will-full or autonomous in the sense of implying 
a pure form of freedom or ability to choose. Rather, such an approach 
conceptualizes migration as a ‘social movement’ that has the capacity to enact 
change (Mezzadra and Nielsen, 2003). The more overtly Marxist strands of this 
body of scholarship focus attention on the importance of labour power, with 
Nicholas de Genova (2011) theorising living labour as the grounds of migrant 
autonomy. In this regard the agential dimensions of unauthorised migration 
might be understood as fixed, even conceptually pre-determined, though in 
terms that are distinct from the liberal choosing subject. There is also a move in 
this body of critical scholarship that conceptualises migration as preceding 
exploitation and control, or as excessive of this (Scheel, 2013). As noted earlier, 
autonomy can be understood in this approach as privileged over, even prior to, 
systemic or structural exploitation (Mezzadra, 2004). The autonomy of 
migration literature therefore can be understood as offering an interpretation of 
migrant autonomy that exceeds the frame of structure-agency, and that seeks to 
emphasize the capacity of migrants to effect change (see Nyers, 2015). 
 
A brief review of these two broad trends in critical border and migration studies 
indicates that each approach emphasises the importance of relations of power-
resistance in different ways. Though neither approach revolves around an 
explicit discussion of ‘migrant agency’, there has been a growing emphasis over 
recent years on the importance of effectively accounting for the role that people 
migrating play in “negotiating” power relations and practices of governing or 
managing migration (Mainwaring, 2016; Mainwaring and Brigdon, 2016), and 
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thus in interfering in “attempts” to enforce power (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). 
These interventions are important, because they question some of the early 
tendencies in critical border and migration studies to assume migrant agency as 
simply given or denied (see Squire, 2015a). In so doing, these works reflect 
efforts by scholars of critical citizenship and migration studies who have 
examined processes of subjectification in relation to dynamics of power-
resistance. This is an important shift, and one which I argue raises more 
problems than answers for scholars seeking to provide an alternative account of 
‘migrant agency. In order to highlight why this is the case I will briefly discuss 
Michel Foucault’s conception of subjectification, before highlighting alternative 
conceptual terms that have come out of literatures inspired by this concept. 
 
 
Subjectification 
 
As the discussion thus far implies, structure/agency is not the only frame 
through which questions of explanation and change can be addressed. Moreover, 
explanation does not need to be our frame of reference either. A focus on 
explanation overlooks different framings of social science and political research, 
namely those orientated more toward a hermeneutical tradition that focuses on 
developing understanding over providing explanation (see Howarth and Glynos, 
2007). An important alternative in this regard emerges from the work of Michel 
Foucault, whose work challenges explanatory social scientific frameworks along 
with the assumptions on which the structure/agency debate relies. Rather than 
taking ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ for granted, and instead of examining these in 
their relation with one another, a Foucauldian approach focuses more detailed 
attention on processes of subject formation. In particular, an emphasis on 
subjectification involves unpacking how subjects are constituted through 
relations of power-resistance, and in this regard problematizes the idea of 
‘agency’ more fundamentally.  
 
For Foucault there is not a free intentional agent nor a strategic actor – instead 
the individual subject is instead understood as an effect of power (Foucault, 
1982, p. 781). What this means is that rather than conceiving individuals as 
reflexive actors capable of strategic action, a Foucauldian approach explores the 
ways in which subjects are constituted as such, particularly through processes of 
self-governing that involve capabilities such as autonomy and enterprise (Rose, 
1999). This is not to a structuralist account, since processes of resistance are 
inseparable from power in Foucault’s work: ‘where there is power, there is 
resistance’ (Foucault, 1984). In other words, the negotiation of power is integral 
to rather than separate from Foucault’s concept of subjectification (see Aradau, 
2008). Yet neither is it an intentionalist account, since Foucault clearly 
problematizes such renderings of the individual subject. Leaning neither toward 
the more constraint- or context-oriented side of the debate nor toward the 
intentionality- or strategic action- side of the debate, Foucault presses us to find 
a new language and approach to the question of unauthorised migration. 
 
A Foucauldian approach can be interpreted as implying what might be called a 
dynamic and relational social ontology. In these terms, such an approach is not 
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wholly dissimilar to that of Hay. However, a Foucauldian approach also exceeds 
the frame of structure-agency, while providing critical insights that resonate 
with many of the critical works discussed in the previous section. Far from 
emphasising the (conscious or unconscious) capacity of unauthorised migrants 
to act in a strategic way (cf. Hay, 2002, p. 132), analyses that take a Foucauldian 
approach as a point of departure tend to consider how unauthorised migration is 
produced as such through operations of power. This is important, given the ease 
by which one might slip from an analysis of ‘migrant agency’ toward 
assumptions that lead to the attribution of responsibility to migrants for 
particular political outcomes. In relation to unauthorised migration, 
responsibility is often attributed to those migrating through processes of 
criminalisation, and/ or denied through processes of victimisation (see also 
Squire, 2009, 2015a). By contrast, the drawing of lines between harmful and 
harmless migrants on the basis of their perceived agency, or lack thereof, is a 
subjectification process that the analyses inspired by Foucault have subjected to 
sustained critique (e.g. Aradau, 2008).  
 
Importantly, critical scholarship in this area also examines contestations or 
processes of resistance that challenge assumptions about the agency of 
unauthorised migrants as either assumed or denied (e.g. Johnson, 2014; Nyers, 
2006; Rygiel, 2010; Squire, 2011). In this regard, a Foucauldian analysis of 
subjectification has been complemented by scholarship drawing on a range of 
conceptual sources as a means to highlight the ‘irregular’ (Nyers, 2011) and 
‘contested’ (McNevin, 2011) subjectivities that are put into motion by people on 
the move (Nyers and Rygiel, 2010). It is through alternative concepts initiated by 
such works that the interventions of people on the move can be engaged in terms 
that effectively exceed the limitations of the structure-agency frame and the 
problematic assumptions to which it can easily succumb. Yet while some critical 
scholars (Innes, 2016; Johnson, 2015; Mainwaring, 2016; Mainwaring and 
Brigden, 2016) have sought to refine the concept of ‘migrant agency’ in terms 
that emphasise important issues related to the negotiation of power through 
everyday practices of resistance, I want to emphasise the significance of 
engaging alternative terms as an intermediary step by which to further refute 
the political and analytical misunderstandings that can arise from the use of such 
a term. It is with this in mind that I will now elaborate the categories of acts, 
interventions and effects as alternative conceptual tools that can be engaged to 
undertake a critical analysis of unauthorised migration beyond the frame of 
structure/agency.   
 
Acts, interventions, effects 
 
The categories of acts, interventions and effects that I elaborate here are 
influenced by scholarship in the field of critical migration studies. Specifically, I 
focus on those that have drawn on the work of Engin Isin, who in particular has 
engaged Austin’s speech act theory as a means by which to develop an analysis of 
enactment or ‘the act’ (Isin and Nielsen, 2008; Isin and Saward, 2013). An act is 
defined by Isin as occurring when established scripts and subjectivities are 
disrupted, thus creating a new script and bringing into being political subjects 
that did not previously exist (Isin, 2008). Acts can be more or less purposive, and 
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are conceptualised as such in terms of their political implications or effects, 
rather than in terms of the choices, strategies or willful actions of those involved. 
Which agents (bodies or agencies) can enact an act is not predefined in this 
approach. Indeed, while acts involve actors they do not in any sense rely on a 
particular conception of what an actor is or does. Rather, a focus on acts 
resonates with the work of Michel Foucault in considering how particular 
subjects are constituted at concrete sites, and come into being as such through 
dynamics of power-resistance.5 
 
An analytics of acts is an important alternative to the frame of structure/agency 
for at least two reasons. First, the notion of the act does not rely on a conception 
of a strategic or intentional actor in any straightforward way. Particular actors or 
bodies may act in strategic terms, but they are not pre-defined as such (see also 
Isin, 2013: 23). Like Hay, the focus is not simply on conscious or purposive 
action. Yet beyond Hay, neither is the focus straightforwardly on strategic action, 
meaning more or less reflexive situated actions that operate within a strategic 
context. In analysing the political significance of bodies crossing borders without 
authorisation, for example, an analytics of acts does not focus on identifying 
unauthorised migration as a strategic action or on assessing its effectiveness as 
such within a strategic context. Rather, the focus is on exploring how far and in 
what ways crossing borders without authorisation disrupts existing ways of 
being and in so doing produces new subjects with new scripts (see also Isin, 
2012). Paying attention to positionality and context is critical here, as is paying 
attention to the ways in which the production of knowledge about migration can 
have disciplining effects (Garrelli and Tazzioli, 2013). With this in mind, 
unauthorised migrants such an approach does not assume those migrating 
without authorization as the only bodies capable of effecting change, though they 
can be particularly important in so doing within the context of a so-called 
‘migration crisis’.  
 
This highlights a second difference between an analytics of acts and the frame of 
structure/agency. Hay’s strategically selective context is approached along the 
lines of a structured situation, within which strategic action is placed and on 
which strategic action works. However, such an approach lends itself more to a 
focus on how effective unauthorised migration is in redressing the difficulties 
experienced by those otherwise constrained by a context such as political and/or 
economic insecurity. By contrast, an analytics of the act involves a focus on much 
more fundamental transformations to the very onto-political foundations within 
which structured contexts and strategic actors are grounded. This leads to 
analyses that draws attention to how crossing borders without authorisation can 
disrupt the very ways in which political life is arranged along the lines of nations 
and states, and which can more fundamentally be understood as conditioning the 
insecurities experienced by many people on the move whose citizenship status is 
put under question (e.g. Johnson, 2015; McNevin, 2006; Nyers, 2006, 2008, 2015; 
Rygiel, 2010; Squire, 2009; Stierl, 2016). The act of crossing international 
borders without authorisation is in this sense understood as politically 
significant, but this is not to say that those migrating without authorisation are 
necessarily held up as exemplary political subjects in and of themselves. As 
Stephan Scheel (2013b) argues in relation to the autonomy of migration 
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approach, the situated practices of particular migrants can importantly exceed 
practices of governing borders, but this is not to romanticize such subjects.   
 
Isin’s approach not only provides the conceptual tools by which to address the 
critical significance of unauthorised migration in relation to existing political 
arrangements and subject positions. It also distances itself from approaches that 
assume either sovereign power or migrant autonomy as dominant frames by 
which to understand unauthorised migration. The concept of acts instead 
resonates more closely with Foucault’s emphasis on the dynamics of power-
resistance, since it refuses any approach that assumes the predominance of 
either power or its resistance and contestation (see also Squire, 2011, 2015b). 
Indeed, an analytics of acts remains attuned to the dynamics of power-resistance 
across concrete sites, and pays attention to how far interventions by bodies in 
action effect a transformation in being through producing new subjects and 
scripts. In highlighting Judith Butler’s theorisation of performativity, Isin 
highlights how the significance of an analytics of acts lies in their reflection of a 
“moment in which a subject – a person, a collective – asserts a right or 
entitlement to a liveable life when no such prior authorisation exists” (Butler 
cited in Isin, 2013: 24). It is in this sense that unauthorised migration can 
directly be interpreted as a political intervention (or potential act) that involves 
the assertion of the right to move and to make claims that are not authorised in 
advance. Those migrating without authorization are not isolated in this 
endeavor, but do occupy a critical position. For example, in his analysis of the 
WatchTheMed activist movement’s documentation of and demand for an 
effective institutional response to people stranded in boats in the Mediterranean 
Sea, Maurice Stierl (2016) points to the way in which ‘international citizenship’ 
is formed through this ‘contentious politics’ (see also Ataç, Rygeil and Stierl, 
2016). The actions of WatchTheMed are critical here, but can only be understood 
as such in terms of an act in solidarity with those who have undertaken an act of 
unauthorised migration. 
 
An analytics of acts or interventions thus facilitates appreciation of the political 
significance of bodies in action from the perspective of their effects within a 
specific context: 
 
…making rights claims are heterogeneous and transformative acts that 
bring subjects into being by their performative force. Whether their 
effects are submissive to existing practices or subversive to them cannot 
be determined in advance but only through the effects of these acts.  
 
(my emphasis, Isin, forthcoming, p. 8).  
 
While there are some complexities to the concept of act and the theorisation of 
citizenship that are beyond the scope of the discussion here, important for us is 
that such an approach provides a frame by which to analyse unauthorised 
migration as an intervention of political significance, which involves effects that 
potentially initiate new onto-political ways of being. An act here is seen as 
differing from an intervention in terms of the extent to which it involves a 
successful generation of new scripts or new ways of being. In the case 
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documented by Stierl, this might thus be understood in terms of the formation of 
new scene and script of international citizenship subjectivity. By examining this 
case in terms of the framework of acts rather than agency, assumptions about 
who has the power to effect change here are less in focus than the effects of the 
specific intervention in practice. Notably, this example thus draws attention to 
the political significance of unauthorised migration, yet without implying 
purposiveness or even strategic action on the part of those migrating in the 
sense that is suggested by Hay.  
 
Let’s briefly consider another example that emerged under conditions of the so-
called European ‘migration crisis’ during 2015, when people were walking 
through Europe in order to claim asylum within central or northern states of the 
European Union. To what extent did this involve a fundamental onto-political 
change through the enactment of new subjects and scripts? Were the European 
bordering practices that are designed to prevent unauthorised migration 
effectively disrupted through such an intervention? Was this simply an 
intervention that engaged and potentially disrupted existing political 
arrangements and relations, or did it in effect form an act that successfully 
constitutes a new onto-political reality or realities? In other words, did these 
bodies in action effectively transform the conditions under which unauthorised 
migration occurred, or did they remain as an intervention that fell short of 
constituting new subjects and scripts? More specifically, did this intervention 
challenge dominant scripts that constitute unauthorised migrant subjects either 
as involving excessive criminal agency (the anti-migration response), or a 
reduced victimized agency (the humanitarian alternative)? These are the kinds 
of questions that an analytics of acts prompts. While they clearly require further 
unpacking than is possible here, it is worth considering them in a little more 
detail in order to emphasise the critical significance of such an approach.  
 
Crossing the Aegean or Mediterranean Sea by boat, arriving without 
authorisation on a Greek island, being transported to mainland Greece and then 
travelling along the Balkan route – often by foot – to central or northern EU 
states to claim asylum emerged as a widespread action in 2015. Indeed, the 
sudden increase of bodies in action on this route could be interpreted as a visible 
manifestation of unauthorised migration as a social movement of the kind 
theorised by scholars of the autonomist Marxist tradition, discussed earlier. Yet 
returning to the analytics of acts proposed in this article, we can view walking 
across Europe by foot as an intervention that involves claims to rights that may 
be embedded within international law (e.g. the right to claim asylum), but which 
have been undermined by European bordering practices that externalize 
controls to keep people at bay (e.g. see Üstübici, 2016). In this sense, the 
intensification of border checks and closures that such an intervention provoked, 
the abandonment of people to harsh terrains that work against their capacity to 
enact change (cf Squire, 2015a,b) as well as the polarised anti-migrant and 
humanitarian responses already discussed, can be understood both as conditions 
and effects of the collective intervention to walk across Europe.  
 
The act of asserting “a right or entitlement to a liveable life when no such prior 
authorisation exists” appears at first as a momentary intervention, and some 
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might argue that such collective acts have been closed down before new subjects 
and scripts emerged.  However, I would argue that this intervention precisely 
created multiple openings for new subjects and scripts to emerge.6 For example,  
Clandestina activists walking in solidarity with people on the move claimed to 
reclaim their humanity through an action that took as its slogan: “In a bosses’ 
world, we are all strangers”.7 Moreover, actions by groups such as Caravane 
Migranti, composed of the families of those disappearing across the Mexico/US 
border as well as from across the Mediterranean also emerged in this context to 
provide new scripts and subjects of solidarity across borders.8 Yet these acts of 
demonstration (Walters, 2008) are inseparable from the everyday – often banal 
– acts (see also Huysmans, 2011). Through these, people on the move and 
settling anew negotiate power-resistance in much less spectacular terms, at the 
“intersections where contestations and ambivalence prevail” (Mainwaring, 2016: 
6). It is here that the development of resources, skills and networks by people on 
the move (see Üstübici, 2016) can be important in the formation of a political act. 
Focusing on the effects of interventions as these relate to the formation of 
subjects and scripts sheds light on the ambiguities and messiness of acts that 
involve the dynamics of power-resistance. It also highlights the critical potential 
of interventions and acts that can be overlooked if the focus remains on the 
success of strategic actions within a strategically selective context.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has emphasised the limitations of the frame of structure/agency for 
the critical analysis of unauthorised migration, and has instead proposed an 
analytics of acts, interventions and effects as a means to unpack the political 
significance of people migrating without authorisation. Specifically, the article 
has pointed to the ways in which structure/agency is analytically reductive, and 
can be employed in terms that feed into processes of criminalisaton or 
victimisation based on assumptions about the excessive or reduced agency of 
unauthorised migrants. The article first unpacked the structure/agency debate in 
terms of a focus on intent and its constraint, before showing how intentionalist 
and structuralist approaches have been challenged by a range of more dynamic 
relational approaches that challenge the duality and dualism of structure-agency. 
It went on to examine in more detail Hay’s critical realist emphasis on strategic 
action in a strategically selective context, highlighting the limitations and risks of 
such an approach from a Foucauldian perspective.  
 
Foucault’s work is important, the article has argued, because it emphasises the 
dynamic formation of subjectivities and recognises both power and resistance as 
integral to such processes. Instead of emphasising the autonomy of migrants or 
the dominance of sovereign power, a Foucauldian approach examines the 
dynamic relation of power-resistance in terms that demand a more nuanced 
analysis attuned to the often ambiguous effects of particular interventions. An 
analytics of acts draws on this insight while also providing for a consideration of 
how interventions can have a more fundamental transformative effect on 
political arrangements and subjectivities that predominate within a given 
context. By reflecting briefly on the collective act of walking without 
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authorisation through Europe in this light, the article has argued that an 
analytics of acts is important for assessing the effectiveness of unauthorised 
migration in disrupting existing onto-political arrangements that divide 
migrating subjects into criminals and victims and deny their political being. Such 
insight can easily be overlooked if the focus remains bound to a frame of 
structure-agency and concerned with the success of strategic actions within a 
strategically selective context.   
 
Despite the sophistication of many relational accounts of structure-agency, the 
grounding of this framework in questions of intentionality and strategic action 
risk reproducing assumptions about subjects whose decision to migrate is more 
or less free from constraint. In sum, the article argues that such assumptions are 
analytically problematic, because they involve a simplification of processes of 
subjectivity formation. Moreover, it also argues that they are they normatively 
and politically problematic in the context of debates around unauthorised 
migration, because discussions of structure/agency can easily slip into the 
legitimisation of wider assumptions about the culpability and/or victimhood of 
people on the move. By drawing out the significance of Michel Foucault’s 
theorisation of subjectification and Engin Isin’s analysis of acts for critical 
scholarship on unauthorised migration, the article has proposed several 
alternative concepts that reject intent/constraint as a grounds for analysis. An 
analysis of acts, interventions and effects, it has argued, are better attuned to 
relations of power-resistance and are thus critical to the analysis of the politics 
of unauthorised migration in the midst of a so-called ‘migration crisis’. While 
critical reformulations of ‘migrant agency’ are important, this article proposes as 
an intermediary step the use of alternative concepts as a means to reject the 
analytical and political misunderstandings – or indeed the political misuse – of 
such terminology. 
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1 Though this article is informed by fieldwork (observations and interviews) for 
my Leverhulme and ESRC projects, it does not draw directly on these as this is 
primarily a conceptual piece. At the time of publication interview transcripts 
from these projects were not publicly accessible as this is a sensitive area and 
care regarding anonymity and other ethical issues is paramount. 
2 While there is much to be said about the problems of both of these terms, this 
article does not focus so much on the problems of engaging the term ‘migrant’ 
here as it does of engaging the term ‘agency’.  
3 This is exemplified with reference to Marxism. A Marxist approach claiming 
that a political and cultural superstructure replicates and reflects an underlying 
economic structure or base involves an ontological assumption regarding the 
structural conditioning and functionality of political, social and cultural 
institutions. Rather than a theory that emerges from an empirical analysis of the 
operation of such institutions, Hay suggests that such a theory posits ontological 
statements as truths and assesses political effects in line with these basic 
assumptions. In other words, Hay argues that ontological assumptions shape 
political explanation in ways that cannot simply be assessed on the basis of 
empirical data (2002, pp. 90-4). 
4 Agamben (1998) engages with the work of Foucault, yet in contrast to Foucualt 
he argues that sovereign power has been implicated ‘from the start’ with 
biopower (i.e. power over life). For Agamben (2005), biopower is therefore 
understood in relation to the power of the sovereign to declare a ‘state of 
exception’, which does not imply a straightforward relation of exclusion but 
rather a relation of abandonment (or ‘the ban’) as an ambiguous ‘zone of 
indistinction’. 
5 In particular, it develops an analysis of the constitution of actors as political 
subjects through exploring processes of rights claiming, or what Isin (2008) and 
others refer to as the claiming of a ‘the right to have rights’ (Nyers, Isin and 
Turner, 2010; see also XXXX and, 2014). 
6 These can be examined at various levels and in various ways, but here I will 
focus on some of the most visible mobilisations for the purposes of fostering 
understanding of the broad argument.  
7 “Understanding the Balkan Route: An interview with Clandestina”, December 
2015,  https://rabble.org.uk/understanding-the-balkan-route-an-interview-
with-clandestina-migrants-network/ (accessed 23.04.2016) 
8 See http://carovanemigranti.org (accessed 23.09.2016) 
